research
Working Papers
The Value of Family Care: Couples, Singles, and Medicaid in Old Age — Job Market Paper
Award: Best Poster Award, Embrace Day Graduate Posters Session, 2026 Canadian Economics Association Annual Meetings.
Presented at: Women in Macroeconomics Conference (Chicago, 2026); Canadian Economics Association Annual Meeting (Vancouver, 2026); Inter-American Development Bank Research Conference (Washington, DC, 2026); Canadian Public Economics Group Annual Meeting (Montréal, 2026).
Abstract. Families and friends provide most of the home care that older Americans receive, and future retirees are projected to have fewer spouses and children to provide it. I ask what this care is worth to households, who absorbs its loss, and how it changes their gains from an expansion of Medicaid. Using Health and Retirement Study data, I estimate a life-cycle model of retired couples and singles that distinguishes spousal care from care provided by children, other relatives, and friends, which lets me measure how much a spouse’s care protects a couple when help from outside the household falls. To remain as well off as with continued family care, households would need a one-time payment averaging \$58,719 (in 2018 dollars), or about 19 percent of their average wealth, when all family care is removed for the rest of their lives. When care from children and others is cut in half, couples need 42 percent less compensation with spousal care than without it. To assess the consequences of declining family support, I consider a scenario based on demographic projections for 2060 in which total family-care hours fall by 37.7 percent. Households buy more paid care, but the added hours replace only 11.9 percent of the lost family hours. They receive less care overall and reduce consumption and saving, while Medicaid transfers change little. Existing family care also reduces households’ gains from more generous Medicaid support by 28.5 percent.
Why do (most) households save and work? — Revise and resubmit at the American Economic Review
Presented at: Canadian Economics Association Annual Meeting (Vancouver, 2026); European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (Nicosia, 2025); Midwest Macroeconomics Meeting (Cleveland, 2025).
Abstract. We quantify why most households save and work, using a life-cycle model with wage risk, endogenous labor supply of both spouses, marital transitions, health, medical expenses, mortality, and bequest motives at the death of the first and last household member, estimated on PSID and HRS data. A model with more motives to save and endogenous labor supply implies smaller roles for precautionary saving against wage risk and for bequest motives than previously suggested. Modeling the entire life cycle implies a larger role for medical expenses, because households save and work for them long before they retire. Marriage and divorce risk has large and offsetting effects on the savings of couples and singles, and thus small effects on aggregate savings, but affects aggregate earnings as much as wage risk.
Abstract. I study how family care and existing public support shape racial differences in retirement wealth and the gains from additional long-term-care insurance. Using Health and Retirement Study data, I estimate a saving model of White and Black single women aged 70 or older. Starting wealth and income account for 65–90 percent of the simulated wealth gap at ages 74–84. With family care and nursing-home risk held fixed, a subsidy covering half of nursing-home expenses yields average wealth-equivalent gains of \$92,000 for White retirees and \$13,000 for Black retirees in the middle third of each race’s income distribution (2018 dollars). The subsidy protects resources retirees would otherwise spend, but provides less additional insurance when existing means-tested support already covers the expense. Its value therefore depends on retirees’ own resources, family help, and the public coverage already in place.
The Incidence of Health Risk: Home Production, Self-Insurance, and Who Bears the Cost
Abstract. We study who bears the welfare cost of health risk and whether home production provides self-insurance. Using matched panel data on consumption, time use, health, and wages, we show that large cross-sectional health gradients in wages and recovered home-production efficiency are largely driven by selection: within couples they nearly disappear, and neither changes at illness onset. We therefore classify couples by permanent income and estimate income-specific health processes in a life-cycle model. Low-income couples spend three times as many years in bad health and hold only one-quarter as much wealth as high-income couples. The model implies that health risk is three times more costly for low-income households, which cope mainly by drawing down assets rather than increasing home production.
Work in Progress
How is Health Produced? Estimating Subjective Health Production Functions